By Dr. Mark Burtman
We started with 2,000 in chips. I got hurt early and went all the way down to 500, but then built it all the way up to 6,000. I had my ups and downs from there, but again I got down to about 46 players. 36th place paid $5,000. I had 11,000 in chips with the blinds around 300-600 plus antes. I picked up pocket Kings under the gun and raised it to about 2000. A young guy in middle position moved all-in with about 9500. I quickly called. He had pocket tens. He started to get up after missing the flop, congratulating me on my hand, when a 10 hit the board on the turn. His set held up. I was dealt those same pocket tens next hand against pocket Jacks and I lost the rest of my chips. Another disheartening drive to Columbus followed soon after.
Again, I took solace in the fact that I played well. I had two of the three things everyone wants with a big pair, but my opponent drew out on me. If I would have won that hand, I would have been over 20,000 in chips and I could have coasted into the money. I liked my chances of winning the tournament, because of the few experienced tournament pros remaining in the field.
I decided to give it one more shot in 2004 at the Bellagio Tournament in Vegas at the beginning of December. I played four 1500-2000 dollar events. I went deep in the pot-limit hold-em, maintaining an average stack throughout the day. There were 245 entries, which normally means that they pay 27 places, but at the Bellagio they don’t pay 27 unless they get 250 entries. I was still in the action with 27 players remaining. I was sitting with about 10,000 in chips and the blinds were 300-600. Vinny Vinh was at my table with over 25,000 in chips. He is a terribly aggressive player, who raises about 40% of the pots. He sat opposite me. A young player from California, whose name I don’t know, grew tired of Vinny’s bullying and began coming back over the top of Vinny. I was in the small blind when Vinny made a standard raise of about 2000. California reraised him as I folded. Vinny reraised him to about 10,000. California also had over 20,000 in chips and moved all-in on him. Vinny thought for an inordinate amount of time before placing 16,000 more chips in the pot, which left him with only 7,000 if he lost. California showed pocket nines, but Vinny showed only Q-J suited. And California dragged the biggest pot of the day at our table. On the very next hand I was in the button. California made a raise to 1800, which I only smooth called with pocket Kings. I call a lot of raises with a variety of hands in pot-limit only to give up after the flop. So, my call was not suspicious. I put him a marginal hand, perhaps a small Ace. When the flop came low cards, he bet the pot. I had only a few thousand more than his pot sized bet, so again he wasn’t concerned with my all-in raise. He had A-8 and my Kings held-up, propelling me into the 20,000 chip club, which was well above average. I was very excited as I was about to end my streak of over 35 straight major tournaments without a cash.
Meantime, Vinny Vinh in one round had raised himself back over 20,000 in chips, doubling through with pocket Queens once. Now I faced a Vinny Vinh raise from the button with A-Q. Against Vinny who could very well have Q-J again, I considered it an easy call. All I had to do was get Vinny trapped and I could get all of his chips. I like loose aggressive players like Vinny. They can bully, but they can also be a great source of chips when you catch them speeding. I had already taken some chips from him earlier in a similar situation. The flop came A-2-3. He underbet the pot 3000, which I should have found suspicious. I announced a raise. I was trying to calculate how big to make it, so I delayed in announcing the amount, finally settling on 8,000 more. Once I had verbalized the size of my bet, he pounced on the pot with an all-in raise. That was bad news. He played the hand much different than I expected and with much more cleverness than I was accustomed to seeing. Did he have A-K? I thought it more likely that he had A-2 or A-3. He could have had a pair of 4′s for that matter. The problem with aggressive players is that you can’t passively conclude your beat every time they move all-in, especially when you hit the flop. If I was planning to ditch the A-Q if an Ace hit, then I shouldn’t have played from the start. Besides, he could just as easily have had A-J. So, I called, and he showed his A-K. In one round he had gone from 25,000 to 7000 and back to 45,000, while I had gone from 10,000 to 20,000 to 0. OUCH!
I finished 25th and once again out of the money. Interestingly, Vinny Vinh failed to even make the money let alone the final table. So, he wasted my chips, thereby reinforcing my feelings that he was just as likely to have a hand that I dominated versus a hand that dominated my own. On Monday I played my last event of the year, the Stud Hi-lo, losing at about 25th, less than ten out of the money. Again, I left with a sense of both reassurance in my skills and despair at my lack of success.
So, I close out 2004 completely shut out of the money for the year. I last made the money at the WSOP in 2003, finishing 5th at the Pot-limit Hold-em event. It was a sort of crowning moment for me to finally make a final table at the WSOP after two years of tournament play. The very next tournament looked like I was going to make the money again in Stud Hi-Lo, but I finished 18th, unable to catch a decent hand down the stretch. Since then, no money finishes. I’ve had several finishes within ten of the money, but no better.
I had two great opportunities for great finishes at the MAPC this summer and again at the Bellagio, but I was taken down by perfect hands, i.e. perfect traps. Kings against Aces, then a set of tens made against my Kings, and finally A-Q against A-K after an Ace had hit the flop. So, what do I conclude? I had arrived at a fairly sinister interpretation of the predominance of perfect hands I witnessed on the internet. Am I to draw the same conclusion now? The answer is no. So the next question is why do I find no fault in the predominance of perfect hands down the stretch in tournament play as opposed to my concerns about the internet? The answer rests in the unique circumstances that arise in the final levels of a tournament. You have a circumstance where 20th wins nothing and 18th wins at least a few hundred dollars sometimes more. Therefore people play cautiously, except for Vinny Vinh, hoping to hang on until the money is made. This means requirements for committing all of one’s chips goes up significantly. It’s not unusual to not see a flop for one or two rounds down the stretch, because that’s how long it takes to find two people willing to go for broke, which is why it generally takes a perfect hand to bust someone down the stretch who has any kind of a chip count. There are two ways that competent players go broke down the stretch other than being trapped by a perfect hand. First, they become shortstacked and are forced to make a stand with a less than desirable hand, like I did in San Jose. When the blinds and antes are eating away at your stack, you can’t afford to get picky. You find a situation where you hope to not be up against a dominating hand and hope for the best. The other situation is the big bluff. You raise with a marginal hand with the expectation of picking up the pot right then and there, but get called by a better hand and lose.
Vinny is wildly aggressive which can be catastrophic when you bust out with double the average stack after amassing a chip stack that was 2-3 times the average. Then again it can be profitable by generating action when you have a powerhouse hand. Against a tighter, more prudent player I would not even take a flop with A-Q down the stretch. But against Vinny, who has shown a willingness to commit 75% of a huge stack before the flop with Q-J, I have to see a flop from the button with A-Q, because there are so many hands that he would make that play with that I could dominate. It was just the unfortunate time that he had type 1 hand. Aggressiveness will get you action when you make a big hand. Shifting gears at the right time will allow you to keep your chips after you trap someone like me. I’m assuming Vinnie didn’t shift out of hyperdrive and eventually crashed on that day, though he has results throughout the year that demonstrate his superior tournament skills.
So, I look at losing with perfect hands as a good thing. I played well, and it took that kind of hand to beat me. One of these days, I’ll be on the upper end of the perfect hand and it will hold up. I’ll be back in the money. Until then I just have to work hard to rebuild my bankroll. Instead of feeling demoralized like I was at the end of last year, I feel invigorated. With TV making its mark on poker I have seen many new faces in the game. More bodies on the tournament circuit means longer intervals between payouts, but it also means bigger payouts. One score over $100,000 would wipe out what I’ve lost in 35 events with a nice profit. I just need some breaks. I grew up a Cub fan, so let me say it now, “I can’t wait for next year.” 2005 will be my fifth WPO. It will be my fifth year of major tournaments. Wow! Five years of tournament poker. If my first had been as bad as my fourth, you wouldn’t be reading this article now. With so many new opportunities in poker, I can wipe out year four in one good day or week of poker. By losing with tough hands as opposed to bad decisions I believe I can still play the game. I just need to get the cards down the stretch.
